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Summary 
This document provides the results of a scoping study into the role of risk perception 
in shaping climate proofing the Netherlands. The main points are the following. 
What is the problem? 
• Climate change cannot be perceived directly; hence, decision-making on 
mitigation and adaptation has to be informed by reports on detection and 
attribution of climate-related signals. 
• As long as the impacts of climate change do not become manifest in “strong 
signals”, such as actual disasters, decision-making will depend on the perceptual 
capacity to see the significant meaning of “weak signals”. 
• Interpretation work directed at “weak signals” often involves risk perception; this 
is an interpretation of an event based on one or more dimensions of the risk-frame 
(which include the likelihood of harm and one’s vulnerability to harm). 
• The perception of climate-related risks (floods, droughts, heat stress, diseases) 
and their geographical variation is crucial for developing adaptation policy and 
for communication about collective and individual choices that affect risks. 
• However, continuous changes in the political, economic, scientific and ethical 
environment of decision-making and communication will make it very difficult 
for all actors to avoid simplifying interpretations and misleading perceptions, 
which may well result in a “dialogue of the deaf” that hampers climate proofing. 
What aspects of the problem need further research? 
• Against this background, there is a need among the Dutch Hotspots for research 
into the question: What conditions can make risk perception work as a positive 
and not as a negative factor in climate proofing the Netherlands? 
Sub-questions Potential knowledge users 
How can policy-makers and practitioners be enabled to 
understand the role of risk perception dimensions in: 
fostering a sense of problem ownership among the public 
and avoiding a “dialogue of the deaf”, 
 
 
Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management 
(and other ministries) 
preventing property devaluation as a result of changing 
location choices by household and firms 
Municipality of Rotterdam, 
Havenbedrijf 
supporting the design and implementation of building 
precautionary measures 
Water boards, municipalities 
(Rotterdam) 
promoting the adoption of appropriate protective measures 
by households and firms, and avoiding non-protective 
responses 
Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations, water 
boards, municipalities  
developing novel insurance options Insurance companies, 
municipality of Rotterdam 
ensuring that residents and employees are well-prepared to 
take context-specific actions in case of an emergency 
Water boards, municipalities 
(Rotterdam, Dordrecht) 
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1. Aim and scope 
Climate proofing the Netherlands will involve the building of hard infrastructure to 
reduce risks in the proactive and prevention stages of the safety chain and also the 
use of “softer” measures, such as insurance schemes or evacuation plans, in the 
preparation stage [Kabat et al., 2005]. The organization of these activities requires a 
participatory approach in which strategies are discussed at all administrative levels. 
This means that, sooner or later, policy-makers, professionals, residents and business 
owners will be confronted with each others’ perceptions of climate-related risks. As 
the recent past has shown, such a confrontation may be a recipe for 
misunderstandings and controversies. 
Although there is a core meaning to the concept of “risk,” the word means different 
things in different situations. For instance, the policy objective of “increasing risk 
perception” can refer to (a) increasing the perceived likelihood of specific unwanted 
events or (b) increasing the feeling of personal vulnerability to stressful events. As 
these are quite different policy impacts, it is important to consider what the word risk 
means and why it is crucial to take risk dimensions, such as likelihood and feeling of 
vulnerability, into account. 
The role of risk perception in shaping climate proofing the Netherlands is an open 
issue in the Knowledge for Climate programme. Several of its Hotspots have 
indicated that they are interested in this topic (e.g. Onderzoeksagenda Waterkader 
Haaglanden and Waterplan Rotterdam). Moreover, a number of recent policy 
documents, such as Versterken waterbewustzijn en waterbewust gedrag, has selected 
risk perception as one of the key research needs in flood safety management [de 
Bruijn, 2008;Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and Ministerie van Binnenlandse 
Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2008]. There is a need for a better understanding of 
what risk perception is, whether it will help or hamper the solution of public policy 
problems, why that may happen, and what policy makers can do to converge their 
policy with the perceptions of residents and business owners. 
The present study addresses knowledge gaps. Specifically, the study aims at the 
following objectives: 
• To make multidisciplinary knowledge on risk perception accessible to potential 
users; 
• To make a brief inventory of knowledge demands; 
• To give suggestions for further research. 
The study is based on multi-disciplinary, behaviour-oriented background literature, a 
focus group discussion an individual interviews with representatives of agencies 
connected to the Hotspots. 
Chapters 2 and 3 describe the relevant background knowledge. Chapter 2 presents an 
introduction to risk perception and the role of frames. Chapter 3 sets out to explain 
the differences between framing climate change and climate proofing. Chapter 4 
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addresses how perception can be translated into policy. This is the basis for the 
identification of knowledge gaps and the suggestions for further research. 
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2. Risks, frames and climate change 
After a short introduction to the perception of risks, this chapter will explain the 
background of the risk-frame and the main risk dimensions. Then it will emphasize 
that climate change is still very much a science-related issue. Because this linkage 
plays an important role in climate-related discussions among scientists and non-
scientist, a simple framework is outlined that demonstrates how perceptions are 
being shaped by underlying principles. 
Risks 
Basically, risks are not directly perceived – what people call “risks” are particular 
interpretations of observed phenomena. These interpretations crucially involve the 
notions of chance and harm. When searching for linguistic evidence for the meaning 
of the English word risk1, Fillmore and Atkins [1994] found at least five senses for 
the noun: 
1. Dangerousness, a dangerous situation (“too much risk attached to it”);  
2. Unpleasant possibility (“the risk of being killed”);  
3. Someone or something dangerous (to/for) (“he is a big risk”); 
4. The possibilities against which one can buy insurance (“to insure against all 
risks”); and 
5. The chance or hazard of commercial loss (“there can be no success without 
risk”). 
Hence, in some of its uses the word risk represents something computable. In 
insurance settings, for example, “risk” seems to have a pre-defined meaning about 
what insurance covers [Hamilton et al., 2007]. 
In other settings, the various uses of the term risk just share some reference to the 
notion that the future is uncertain, and that among the alternative possible futures that 
one faces are some that one might want to avoid [Fillmore and Atkins, 1992]. This 
interpretation can be found, for example, in discussions about when climate change 
will become “dangerous” for the environment; the latter was an important issue at the 
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [Lowe and 
Lorenzoni, 2007]. 
The risk-frame and its risk dimensions 
With regard to people’s understanding of the word risk, it is theoretically assumed 
that their interpretations are shaped by an underlying organizing principle or frame. 
The risk-frame enables them to understand the word's meaning with reference to a 
structured background of experiences, beliefs or practices [Barsalou, 1999]. Once 
individuals can master the word to a culturally acceptable degree, they have an 
adequate understanding of it. 
                                               
1
  The English word “risk,” the French “risque,” and the Dutch “risico” are derived from the 
Italian words “risco” or “risico”. 
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It should be emphasized that the frame of an abstract term, such as risk, is never 
experienced directly in its entirety. Depending on the circumstances, subsets of frame 
information (subframes) become active to highlight specific risk dimensions. The 
literature on risk perception [e.g. Sjöberg, 2000;Slovic, 1992;Vlek and Stallen, 1979] 
has identified a number of (partly overlapping) risk dimensions; the most important 
of which are: 
• the degree to which exposure to the risk is voluntary, 
• the likelihood of harm,  
• one’s vulnerability to harm (or lack of control over harm),  
• the extent of harm a hazard would cause, and  
• the degree to which sources of risk information can be trusted. 
The value-laden meanings of the different risk dimensions demonstrate that frames 
are not just personal mindsets but mainly cultural structures. The frames shape in a 
“hidden” and taken-for-granted way, for example, how a problem is stated, what 
questions appear relevant and what range of answers might be appropriate. A specific 
example is the “safety chain,” a set of risk dimensions developed by professionals. 
In sum, it appears that risk perception can be described as an interpretation of an 
event based on one or more dimensions of the risk-frame. This means that there is 
room for different interpretations. People often underestimate how, for example, risk 
communication can be hampered by differences in the risk dimensions they use (e.g. 
one person focusing on the likelihood dimension and the other on trust). If the frames 
of two opponents share too little, they will even be unable to communicate.  
In cases of policy controversies, frames also affect how social actors interact with 
other actors and take shared or opposing positions regarding an issue. Policy 
controversies arise in the politically coloured process of policy design when shifts in 
the situation, internally or externally generated, trigger conflicts of interests rooted in 
the actors' divergent frames [Schön and Rein, 1994]. Accordingly, an analysis of 
competing frames (or subsets of frame information) may help to make the positions 
of the opponents more transparent and negotiable. 
“Dangerous” climate change 
In the past decades, studies in many countries have examined whether citizens 
perceive climate change as a risk in the sense of being “dangerous for the 
environment” [Bord et al., 1998;Kempton et al., 1995;Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 
2006;Slimak and Dietz, 2006]. These studies revealed that many citizens of the 
developed countries saw global climate change as an issue with potentially serious 
but geographically and psychologically distant consequences. 
However, some extreme weather events, such as severe rain- and river-based floods, 
have had a significant impact on risk perceptions in certain regions [de Boer, 2007]. 
Among the citizens of these regions, the levels of worry about climate change and 
natural disaster were relatively high and both variables were significantly correlated. 
The weather events may have contributed to a process in which risks that were 
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largely distal were reframed into more proximal risks with consequences that are 
much closer to people's personal lives.  
Looking into more detail, dangerousness is not the only frame information that is 
relevant here. Because climate change is still very much a scientific issue, it is one of 
the policy areas that regularly generate debates among scientists and non-scientists. 
Social scientists who analyzed public discussions on science-related issues found that 
these issues are often linked to a few frames that consistently appear across different 
policy areas [Gamson and Modigliani, 1989;Nisbet, 2009].  
For example, synthetic pesticides, such as DDT, have been framed as a blessing for 
humanity (before 1962), but also as Pandora's box (after the publication of Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962), as a matter of specific risks and benefits to be 
decided on scientific evidence (with the rise of ecotoxicology as a science in the 
1980s and 1990s), and as a key factor to keep certain industries competitive (along 
with each new pesticide regulation). 
Framework of perceptual contrasts 
To clarify their meaning, the eight frames identified in the literature can be 
characterized in terms of two perceptual contrasts.  
The first contrast involves a promotion or prevention orientation to goal-directed 
behaviour [Higgins, 1997;2000]. Generally, a promotion orientation makes the 
person sensitive to positive outcomes and hits that may be gained through 
aspirations, accomplishments, and ideals. In contrast, a prevention orientation makes 
the person sensitive to negative outcomes and errors that have to be avoided by 
fulfilling one's moral obligations and responsibilities.  
This difference is not just a matter of personal mindsets – the orientations can be 
associated with certain institutions, subcultures within an organization, or 
occupational groups. Engineers, for example, are said to be safety oriented and 
inclined to “overdesign” for safety [Schein, 1996]. 
The second contrast involves taking a distal or proximal view on an object. A distal 
view may evoke broad categories to represent general features of the object rather 
than its more contextual and incidental aspects [Liberman et al., 2007]. This may 
include more abstract moral principles to judge the object. In contrast, a proximal 
view induces categories that are narrower to represent more detailed and 
contextualized features. A proximal view is also more constrained by concrete 
realities, including how other people do things. The person’s attention may focus on 
important, goal-based aspects, or actively suppress irrelevant aspects [Goldstone and 
Barsalou, 1998].  
Again, these perceptual differences also have cultural relevance. They are closely 
related to differences between holistic and analytical ways of thinking, each of which 
may have become more useful and more available in one culture than in another. For 
instance, Easterners tend to engage more in holistic perceptual processes whereas 
Westerners tend to engage more in analytical ones [Nisbett, 2003].  
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Figure 2 combines the two perceptual contrasts and presents four cells that reflect 
promotion or prevention orientations in combination with a distal or a proximal view. 
Building on that framework, Figure 2 captures the different frames that may underlie 
discussions on science-related issues. In addition, each cell provides an example of a 
matching climate-related issue. 
Promotion orientation Prevention orientation
Using broad categories
to represent general features
and 
focusing on 
gaining positive outcomes (hits)
Distal
view
Proximal
view
Using narrow categories
to represent contextualized features
and 
focusing on
avoiding negative outcomes (errors)
Using narrow categories
to represent contextualized features
and 
focusing on
gaining positive outcomes (hits)
Using broad categories
to represent general features
and 
focusing on
avoiding negative outcomes (errors)
 
Figure 1. Two perceptual contrasts combined. 
The four cells in Figure 2 illustrate that there are major differences between the ways 
in which climate-related issues are being framed. Without going into details, it can be 
said that Al Gore’s movie, An Inconvenient Truth, reflects holistic and moral 
thinking about climate change, calling for precaution in the face of potentially 
catastrophic impacts.  
Promotion orientation Prevention orientation
Social progress frame
defines the issue as improving quality of 
life or harmony with nature
Middle way frame
puts the emphasis on finding a possible 
compromise position between polarized 
views 
> Plan for a tulip-shaped island
Distal
view
Proximal
view
Scientific uncertainty frame
defines the issue as a matter of what is 
known versus unknown
Public accountability frame
defines the issue as responsible use or 
abuse of science in decision-making
> Report Second Deltacommittee 
Economic development frame
defines the issue as investment that 
improves competitiveness
Conflict/strategy frame
defines the issue as a game among elites, 
a battle of personalities or groups
> Climate Proof City
Morality/ethics frame
defines the issue in terms of right or 
wrong; respecting or crossing limits
Pandora’s box frame
defines the issue as a call for precaution in 
face of possible impacts or catastrophe
> Al Gore, An inconvenient truth
 
Figure 2. Science-related frames [adapted from Nisbet, 2009] grouped into four 
perceptual contrasts, with examples about climate issues. 
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In the Netherlands, the report by the second Deltacommittee [2008] takes a more 
proximal view, drawing on the latest scientific insights on plausible upper limits of 
regional sea level rise. The report’s publication stimulated a lively discussion on 
scientific uncertainty. Both Al Gore’s movie and the Deltacommittee report 
demonstrate the characteristics of a prevention orientation, which aims to avoid 
errors in dealing with the earth’s atmosphere. 
In turn, both prevention-oriented frames contrast with two promotion-oriented 
frames. Promotion-oriented frames highlight the possible gains that climate-related 
issues can entail for society. These frames may be linked to the notion of a “climate 
proof city”, such as the city of Rotterdam, which emphasizes its competitiveness by 
advertising its various strengths. A more distal view is reflected by the plan for a 
tulip-shaped island near the Dutch coast, which can be seen as a means of reconciling 
the objectives of land reclamation and coastal management. 
Relevance of the framework 
It should be emphasized that Figure 2 is meant to improve our understanding of the 
various ways in which climate issues may be framed. The importance of the contrasts 
is threefold.  
Firstly, the contrasting pairs indicate that each frame may be a necessary but 
certainly not sufficient condition for effective decision-making. Prevention may have 
to be complemented with promotion (or vice versa), and the distal view of broad 
strategic planning needs a more implementation-oriented, proximal way of thinking 
about how measures can be organized. Therefore, there is no reason to claim that, 
independent of the context, a certain frame is better than the others. 
Secondly, contrasting frames may be used to support effective decision-making. One 
of the characteristics of frames is that they tend to induce a passive acceptance of the 
information given [Kahneman, 2003]. Because each frame may have its strengths 
and weaknesses in articulating the specifics of a situation, introducing a contrasting 
frame may open-up decision-making and enables people to adapt their ways of 
reasoning and understanding to novel and complex worlds. 
Thirdly, scientists and non-scientists will also use the contrasting pairs to influence 
decision-making in the future. Social actors often try to influence each others’ frame 
by using particular communication symbols (framing devices), such as historical 
examples from which lessons are drawn (e.g. the most dramatic recent disaster), 
metaphors and visual images (e.g. picture of a polar bear). By adopting one of the 
frames they will try to open certain positions in favour or against an issue. Hence, it 
can be expected that the different frames will continue to shape climate-related 
communication in the years to come. 
Conclusion 
Risk perception is an interpretation of an event that is based on one or more 
dimensions of the risk-frame. There is room for different culturally acceptable 
interpretations. In addition, some other frames may be used in societal debates on 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 8
climate-related issues. These include a social progress frame, an economic 
competitiveness frame, a moral boundaries frame, and a scientific uncertainty frame. 
These frames will continue to shape climate-related communication in the years to 
come. 
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3. Reframing distal risks into proximal risks 
This chapter will explain that there are crucial differences between the frame that 
people tend to use to understand climate change and the frame that is required for a 
proper approach to climate proofing. The differences are growing in importance, 
because the coming years will show a continuous process of risk communication 
about climate issues. As described below, what has to happen is that risks with a 
distal character are reframed into more proximal risks. 
Common cause and common effect models 
Frames, such as mental models of causal structures, provide the fundamental 
representation of human knowledge. In view of this, it should be noticed that thought 
processes on climate change and climate proofing will involve quite different mental 
models [de Boer, 2008]. The difference relates to two causal-chain structures, 
namely common cause and common effect models. 
The crucial differences between the two models can be demonstrated by people’s 
beliefs about, on the one side, living animals and, on the other side, artefacts. Even 
preschool children assume that living things have vital forces inside them that are 
responsible for growth and activity [Keil, 2006]. In contrast, artefacts are developed 
to serve a function or a purpose.  
Preschool children, for example, do understand that dogs are different from tables. 
Dogs and other living animals are seen as having an essence that works as a common 
cause of different dog-like phenomena (see Figure 2). Conversely, young children 
conceive of artefacts in terms of functions. The table-like function is the common 
effect that is produced by the different constituting elements from which tables are 
assembled. 
Generally, people assume and prefer a common-cause structure regarding “natural” 
categories [Ahn et al., 2001]. Common-cause models are relatively easy to 
understand and can flexibly be extended or reduced [Kinchin et al., 2000]. In 
contrast, common-effect models require more knowledge about the constituting 
elements and their mutual relationships. 
The common-cause model is not only relevant for purely natural phenomena, but 
also for people’s relationship to the habitable earth. It captures the idea of humans as 
geographic agents who changed the earth from its hypothetical pristine condition 
[Glacken, 1967]. The common-cause is that human activities are threatening the 
essence of nature; e.g. people are playing with things they barely understand, such as 
the earth’s atmosphere. 
The common-cause model may help people to become aware of the many ways in 
which climate change can become manifest, such as by changes at the North pole, in 
the Alps, in sea level and in patterns of rainfall. This understanding may to a certain 
extent be in line with established scientific knowledge, such as the “joint attribution 
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approach” [Rosenzweig et al., 2008], which involves a meta-analysis of the physical 
and biological impacts of anthropogenic climate change.  
In contrast, making a country climate proof by adaptation and mitigation measures 
requires a completely different mental model. Climate proofing should be driven by 
opportunities for technological, institutional and societal innovations, rather than 
purely by fear of the negative effects of climate change [Kabat et al., 2005]. 
Therefore, climate proofing is a common effect of different constituting elements 
that have to be balanced carefully. The contrast between the two mental models is 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Essence of
a dog
Barking
Legs
Fur
Mouth
(…)
Fully functioning
table
Floor
Design
Tabletop
Legs
(…)
Model of a living animal Model of an artefact
 
Figure 2. Two mental models: The dog’s essence is a common cause; the functioning 
table is a common effect. 
 
Common cause
Climate change
Effect 4
Rainfall
Effect 1
The North pole
Effect 2
The Alps
Effect 3
Sea level
Effect x
On Y
Common effect
Climate-proofing
Measure 4
Adaptation option
Measure 1
Mitigation option
Measure 2
Mitigation option
Measure 3
Adaptation option
Measure x
Mixed option
Framing climate change Framing climate-proofing
 
Figure 3. Two mental models: Climate change is a common cause; climate-proofing 
is a common effect. 
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The shift from thinking about climate change to thinking about climate proofing will 
not happen automatically. It requires a process of reframing, but a frame tends to 
induce passive acceptance of the information given. Usually, if an observation does 
not fit the frame it is the observation rather than the frame itself that is being 
questioned. Hence, an active approach is often called for. 
Active reframing 
Active reframing implies that thinking about climate change at a distal level has to be 
supplemented by thinking at a proximal level. In the past, uncertainty about climate 
change may have lead people to conceptualize it in terms of abstract and distal 
properties [Wakslak and Trope, 2009]. As more information comes available on its 
concrete manifestations and consequences reframing will be inevitable. One of the 
options for active reframing is considering a situation from different perspectives to 
make different aspects of it salient. This process is already going on because 
increasingly climate-related data are provided that inform regional and local 
perspectives. 
The psychological difference between distal and proximal levels is a topic of much 
research today [Liberman and Trope, 2008]. A distal view may focus on distant 
future actions. It is closely related to different dimensions of psychological distance, 
such as distance across time and space, social distance and distance in the sense of 
considering hypothetical assumptions. Conversely, a proximal view may include 
implementation practices. Thinking about the how of an activity relates to steps that 
are psychologically near, such as the detailed and contextualized features of 
implementation. Although this line of research has not yet been applied to climate 
proofing, some tentative expectations can be outlined. 
Shocks 
Any new information on the prospects of people’s family or work may to a certain 
degree act as a “shock” to their current situation [Lee and Mitchell, 1994]. Notably, 
the shock can be a positive, neutral or negative event. Over time, sequences of 
shocks may occur. Future societal communication about the various manifestations 
and consequences of climate change will include issues that fit into the science-
related frames mentioned in the previous chapter, such as big plans for climate 
proofing and appealing investments that improve competitiveness, but also moral 
concerns about crossing limits that should not be crossed, and scientific uncertainty 
about what is known. 
Additionally, there will be communication about potential proximal measures, such 
as measures to counteract rising flood risks in certain areas. Whether intended or not, 
this communication may affect many decisions that residents and business owners 
make about the living and working conditions in these areas. People’s responses will 
depend on how they construct a personal decision frame with which to interpret the 
implications of the events. 
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In some cases, people might frame the situation as a binary choice between staying in 
or moving out of the area with rising flood risks. However, there are other frames 
and decision paths that people can take. When they receive new information about 
their environment, for example, they may reappraise the value of investments in their 
property and reconsider the value of risk-reducing measures or insurance. 
Multilevel processes 
The notion that people may construct a personal frame and take a decision path goes 
beyond the traditional economic view of decision-making. The broader view is that 
real world decisions depend on multilevel processes [e.g. Beach, 1990;Carver and 
Scheier, 1998;Carver and Scheier, 2002;Lee and Mitchell, 1994;Liberman et al., 
2007;Vallacher and Wegner, 1987]. Although these authors use slightly different 
terms to specify the processes, it can be stated that effective decision-making on 
climate proofing will require the following elements: 
• a distal view to keep an eye at long-term values, such as “the why” of staying in 
the area with rising flood risks, 
• a proximal view to stimulate implementation intentions, such as “the how” of 
risk-reducing strategies, and 
• a “bridge-like” guiding principle that energizes and directs behaviour by linking 
processes at distal and proximal levels. 
An example of a bridge-like guiding principle is the responsibility for the tasks 
associated with home ownership or membership of a community that fosters a 
culture of self-reliance [McGee and Russell, 2003].  
In order to communicate the notion of manageable risk, all levels are relevant. 
Obviously, without “the how” of risk-reducing strategies, people might get 
overwhelmed by a shock. Alternatively, without paying attention to long-term values 
and a guiding principle, people might just take a single action, assuming that this is 
enough to close the case [Marx et al., 2007]. Such a single action effect is often 
overlooked by policy-makers who want to raise awareness. 
Broader implications 
In addition to this brief description of active reframing, some broader implications 
should be mentioned.  
Reframing does not always start with a shock to the current situation. The process 
may also start unobtrusively. Over time, both the living conditions in a certain area 
and the residents can change, such that elements of the situation no longer fit with 
the residents’ long-term values and guiding principles. Sooner or later, a lack of fit 
can lead to a growing concern about the prospects of their family or work. 
Further, given the social and spatial context in which residents and business owners 
take decisions on aspects of living and working, the outcomes will also affect the 
image of the area. Hence, the decisions that the owners make can affect climate 
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proofing both directly (e.g., via the measures taken) and indirectly (e.g., by changing 
the vital image of the environment). 
Finally, it may not be the risk-frame as such, but the science-related frames that play 
the largest role in this context (a social progress frame, an economic competitiveness 
frame, a moral boundaries frame, and a scientific uncertainty frame). The impacts of 
these frames on climate proofing could be positive or negative. For instance the 
economic competitiveness frame may induce worries among residents who have 
reason to fear that rising flood risks will decrease the value of their property.  
Alternatively, the economic competitiveness frame might also increase the 
investment appeal of insurance among residents and business owners. There is one 
study that suggests that people prefer to invest in something that offers them the 
opportunity to salvage something positive from a potentially negative situation [e.g. 
Connor, 1996], but other explanations are possible. 
Conclusion 
Climate change may be relatively easy to grasp if it is conceived as a common cause 
of different changes in nature. That is important to raise public awareness of the 
issue. However, climate proofing will involve a different mental model. This model 
should consider all the measures necessary to produce the common effect of a 
climate-proof country. Such a mental model is far more difficult to communicate. 
Risks with a distal character have to be reframed into more proximal risks. Various 
science-related frames may have positive or negative impacts on this process. 
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4. Translating perception into policy 
Although the previous chapters have demonstrated that there is a lot of background 
knowledge about perception, there is still the question how perception can be 
translated into policy. In particular the key role of frames in shaping perception, 
communication, network interaction and decision-making has to be elaborated to 
make it fit for purpose of climate proofing. The elaboration should be adapted to the 
needs of the Hotspots and the way in which they see their role in the coming years. 
The present chapter addresses the main user needs. 
Acting on “weak signals” 
In the case of climate change, the role of perception cannot easily be underestimated, 
because decision-making on mitigation and adaptation has to be informed by reports 
on detection and attribution of climate-related signals. As long as the impacts of 
climate change do not become manifest in “strong signals”, such as actual disasters, 
decision-making will depend on the perceptual capacity to see the significant 
meaning of “weak signals”. Obviously, this notion is reflected in the series of reports 
produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [e.g. Carter et al., 
2007]. 
Interpretation work directed at “weak signals” often involves risk perception [e.g. 
Kasperson, 1992;Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001]. In the previous chapters, it has been 
argued that risk perception can be conceived as an interpretation of an event that is 
based on one or more dimensions of the risk-frame (e.g. voluntariness, the likelihood 
of harm, one’s vulnerability to harm or control over harm, the extent of harm a 
hazard would cause, one’s trust in sources of risk information). There is room here 
for different culturally acceptable interpretations. This relates to the predefined, 
computable meaning of risk used by scientists and the non-predefined interpretation 
by non-scientists. 
The perception of climate-related risks (floods, droughts, heat stress, diseases) and 
their geographical variation is in particular relevant because the impacts of policy 
options on climate change adaptation appear to be very context specific [Halsnæs et 
al., 2007]. It is the specific combination of climate change and other environmental 
changes, such as changes in regional land use patterns, that may create the most 
significant impacts for society. Therefore, perceptions are crucial for developing 
adaptation policy and for communication about collective and individual choices that 
affect risks. 
In addition, it should be noted that scientists and non-scientists will also use other 
frames to influence decision-making. The point is that climate change is still very 
much a scientific issue [Robinson et al., 2006]. The science-related frames include a 
social progress frame, an economic competitiveness frame, a moral boundaries 
frame, and a scientific uncertainty frame. These frames will continue to shape 
climate-related communication and decision-making in the years to come. 
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Hence, acting on “weak signals” will require many interactions and dialogues [e.g. 
de Boer et al., 2003;Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat and Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2008]. Moreover, continuous changes in 
the political, economic, scientific and ethical environment of decision-making will 
make it very difficult for all actors involved to avoid simplifying interpretations and 
misleading perceptions. This may well result in a “dialogue of the deaf” that hampers 
climate proofing. 
Types of activities affected 
The collective and individual choices that are affected by risk perceptions relate to 
activities at different geographic scales and in different stages of the safety chain. 
Recent studies provide the following information. 
Data at a country level suggest that risk perception (% of the population agreeing that 
climate change is “dangerous”) is correlated with the priority that is given to climate 
change issues in national policy-making [Tjernström and Tietenberg, 2008]. 
Different kinds of democratic channels also mattered a great deal in how the 
perceptions affected policy. These results are in line with the notion that public 
participation may foster a shared sense of ownership of the problem if it is well-
framed [Few et al., 2007;McGee and Russell, 2003]. 
At the level of a regional housing market, the international literature indicates that 
flood risk perception, informed by flood zone designation and insurance premiums, 
might affect location choices and property values. However, these impacts are not 
observed easily, for example, because living near the coast can also be attractive. 
Hence, sales price differentials may only be revealed after controlling for amenities 
[Bin et al., 2008]. Nevertheless, news on rising flood risks might induce worries 
among residents or business owners about the decreasing value of their property. 
Awareness of physical vulnerabilities to hazards is an important dimension of risk 
perception. Dependent on their location, residents may frame climate change in a 
way that articulates its associations with sea-level rise and/or rain- and river-based 
problems [de Boer, 2007]. However, comparatively little research has been 
conducted on the influence of people’s location and proximity on perception of risk 
[Brody et al., 2008]. In the Netherlands, there are some reports on citizen opinion 
surveys in various parts of the country, which give information about risk-related 
opinions of the residents in these areas [B&A Groep, 2006;TNS Nipo, 2006;2007]. 
However, this work is not embedded in the scientific literature. 
At the regional and local level, risk perceptions are also relevant for the adoption of 
building precautionary measures, such as elevated building configuration or flood 
adapted use [Kreibich et al., 2005]. This can be an important way of motivating 
residents in flood-prone areas to take their share in damage prevention. For example, 
in the context of the 2002 flood at the river Elbe and its tributaries, damage ratio for 
contents was reduced by 48% due to flood adapted use and by 53% due to flood 
adapted interior fitting. 
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Generally, risk perception is related to the adoption of various kinds of protective 
behaviour that can prevent negative consequences of a hazard [Brewer et al., 
2007;Miceli et al., 2008]. However, the actual role of risk perception in shaping 
health behaviour is an undecided issue. In particular, there is no agreement in the 
literature about the relevant dimensions of the risk-frame, which may involve 
likelihood judgments, sense of vulnerability, or extent of harm a hazard would cause. 
One or more dimensions of the risk-frame also affect the willingness to pay for 
insurances against damage caused by floods. This is a new topic in the Netherlands. 
The adoption of insurance options is complicated by various other factors, such as 
private investments in damage mitigation measures, residents’ expectancies about 
compensation of flood damage by the government, and the design of insurance 
schemes [Botzen et al., 2008]. 
In the preparation stage of the safety chain, simply influencing risk perception may 
be insufficient to cause residents to behave appropriately [Grothmann and Reusswig, 
2006;Terpstra and Gutteling, 2008]. Additionally, risk communication should 
address issues of context-dependent action, including the possibility, effectiveness 
and costs of private precautionary measures. Moreover, this communication should 
avoid elements that produce non-protective responses. 
Although many issues deserve further empirical research, these studies demonstrate 
that risk perception can affect collective and individual choices that are extremely 
relevant for policy-making. Hence, more knowledge on these potential impacts may 
help discover how risk perception can work as a positive and not as a negative factor 
in climate proofing the Netherlands. 
User needs 
Our focus group discussion with Hotspot representatives revealed that policymakers 
and practitioners are in particular worried about the potential negative impacts of 
communication failures on climate proofing in relation to floods. There is a general 
lack of knowledge and confidence about the way in which positive communication 
results can be achieved, such as fostering a shared sense of ownership of the problem 
and effectively communicating the notion of manageable risk. 
Based on the focus group discussion and the recent literature a set of user needs has 
been identified. The main question to be addressed is:  
What conditions can make risk perception work as a positive and not as a negative 
factor in climate proofing the Netherlands? 
Research into this question should enable policy-makers and professionals to 
understand the role of risk perception dimensions in their work. This can be achieved 
by developing methods that Hotspots can apply to recognize the frames that underlie 
the ways in which policymakers, practitioners (e.g. journalists), residents and 
business owners perceive climate proofing and its background.  
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The link with practical tools has been elaborated in a number of sub-questions. The 
next scheme gives an overview of the sub-questions, the potential knowledge users, 
and the state of present knowledge of the topic. 
 
Sub-question 
How can policy-makers and 
professionals be enabled to 
understand the role of risk 
perception dimensions in: 
Potential knowledge user Present knowledge 
fostering a sense of problem 
ownership among the public 
and avoiding a “dialogue of 
the deaf”, 
Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water 
Management (and other 
ministries) 
Some studies have been done 
in other fields 
preventing property 
devaluation as a result of 
changing location choices by 
household and firms 
Municipality of Rotterdam, 
Havenbedrijf 
Limited knowledge 
supporting the design and 
implementation of building 
precautionary measures 
Water boards, municipalities 
(Rotterdam) 
Limited knowledge 
promoting the adoption of 
appropriate protective 
measures by households and 
firms, and avoiding non-
protective responses 
Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations, water 
boards, municipalities  
Several studies have been 
done in other fields, but there 
are undecided issues 
developing novel insurance 
options 
Insurance companies, 
municipality of Rotterdam 
Some pioneering work 
[Botzen et al., 2008] 
ensuring that residents and 
employees are well-prepared 
to take context-specific 
actions in case of an 
emergency 
Water boards, municipalities 
(Rotterdam, Dordrecht) 
Some pioneering work 
[Terpstra and Gutteling, 
2008] 
 
Each of these sub-questions can be linked to research into broader themes. For 
example, risk perception can be put in the context of economic welfare theory to 
determine the potential impact of the risk dimensions on the estimated monetary 
value of safety measures.  
Another topic is the relationship between risk perception and the way in which the 
members of a policy network try to shape the outcomes of policy design and 
implementation. Risk perception may also raise ethical issues, for instance, about the 
way in which society should put weight on the various risk dimensions. However, 
research into these topics goes beyond the needs of the Hotspots at the moment. 
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